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Steven Brander, 1 
Chief Justice John Roberts and the Affordable Care Act Decision 
I. Introduction 
In the summer of2012, the Supreme Court of the United States effectively held the 
Affordable Care Act to be Constitutional and paved the way for major health care reform in 
America. When the decision came down, there was shock and consternation among 
conservatives because the key Justice to the majority's decision was the conservative Chief 
Justice John Roberts. Seeming to break from his traditional grouping, the Chief Justice sided 
with the liberal members of the Court to uphold the signature legislation of a Democratic 
president. The question to be asked is whether the Chief Justice's opinion in the Affordable Care 
Act decision is an aberration that caught those following the Court off guard, or does it instead fit 
with John Robert's other decisions and overall judicial approach. To answer this question, it is 
fust necessary to look at John Roberts' life before the Court; his childhood, his years in school, 
and the early influences that shaped his legal perspective. After this biographical overview, the 
Chief Justice's opinions prior to the Affordable Care Act decision will be analyzed in order to 
understand the jurisprudential framework he may have been following in writing that opinion. 
Next, the Affordable Care Act decision itself will be examined to see it indeed is in accord with 
John Robert's previous writings and reflects any of the biographical information also to be 
discussed below. Finally, the Chief Justice's opinions since the Affordable Care Act decision 
will be analyzed to determine if he has remained consistent in his approach. 
II. John Roberts' Years Before the Court 
John Glover Roberts was born on January 27, 1955 in Buffalo, New York. He was born 
to Rosemary and John Glover Roberts, Sr. and his father worked for Bethlehem Steel. John 
1 
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Glover Sr.'s work required the family to move from Buffalo to Long Beach, Indiana, where he 
was to open up a new mill. The family moved to the town of only I ,500 residents when John 
Roberts Jr. was in the fourth grade and their first home there was situated along the shore of 
Lake Michigan. Shortly thereafter, the family of six, John Sr., Rosemary, John Jr., and his three 
sisters, moved away from the lakeshore to a split level home a few blocks away. 1 
Like other children from similar backgrounds, John Roberts Jr. had the benefit of an 
excellent education from his early years. He first went to school at Notre Dame and then went on 
to La Lumiere, an all-boys boarding school in nearby La Porte, Indiana? There, John Roberts Jr. 
excelled academically and managed to be captain of the football team despite his mediocre 
athletic ability. He also found time to compete on the school's wrestling team and track squad 
while being involved in number of clubs. John Robert Jr. was impressive indeed. One of his 
school mates recalled the young Chief Justice's ability to make a unique argument, recalling that 
"[h ]e could take an argument that was borderline absurd and argue for it so well that you were 
almost at the point of having to accept his stance even though it was intuitively obvious that it 
was absurd."3 After speaking to another of John Robert's classmates, the New York Times found 
that in his senior year, "John Roberts went beyond a simple book-report assignment to pore 
through a dense set of seven philosophy tomes, then proceeded to hold forth for several class 
periods while some of his classmates struggled to fill a few minutes.'"' Furthermore, it was clear 
that John Roberts was well ahead of his peers. "When he got things wrong, people thought there 
1 Todd S. Purdum, et al, Court Nominee's Life is Rooted in Faith and Respect for Law, New 
York Times (July 21, 2005), http:/ fwww.nytimes.com/2005/07 /21fpolitics/-
21nominee.html 
2 l!l.. 
3 l!l.. 
4ld. 
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might be something wrong with the teacher, not with him, because he was so off the 
charts ... [n]ot many people could keep up with him."5 
After his stellar years at La Lumiere, John Roberts went on to excel at Harvard, where he 
graduated suma cum laude after only three years and magna cum laude from Harvard Law. His 
academic prowess was just as pronounced at Harvard as it had been in Robert's early years. One 
of his friends, Lazarus, reminisced that nothing short of perfection was good enough. 6 The Chief 
Justice did not however alienate those around him. Rather, "[b ]y all accounts, during his Harvard 
years, Judge Roberts excelled academically but also stood out for his even-tempered nature and 
his ability to engage with people with many different viewpoints." 7 
As with all appointees to the nation's highest court, a major point of interest was John 
Robert's political leanings. While his academic record was clearly exemplar, the Chief Justice's 
standing as a conservative was far less pronounced, though it was obvious he was a Republican 
by 2005. There were no clear signs in his early years, in fact when asked about her son's 
conservatism, Rosemary Roberts remarked that while the family shared in her son's views, it was 
not the within the Roberts house from which this views germinated. "Asked how her son became 
a solid conservative, Rosemary Roberts said, "I don't know, only God will know," but she said 
her son's views are shared by other family members."8 In his school years, John Roberts 
displayed conservatism in the traditional sense, rather than of the type more associated with 
today's political environment. "He had a sort of thoughtful respect for institutions, history, 
precedent, a willingness to consider change but not revolutionary. He believed in having some 
5 ld. 
6.!.d,. 
7J.d. 
B.!.d,. 
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humility about one's ability to suddenly decree that those who carne before you were wrong, but 
he was not a stick in the mud either. "9 Roberts was also described as displaying "a Midwestern 
d . . ,10 reserve an qmet conservatism. 
John Robert's first job out oflaw school was a clerkship with Judge Henry Friendly, of 
the Second Circuit of Appeals. Roberts and Friendly were similar in many ways. Both were born 
in small upstate New York towns, both excelled academically, both had a love of history, and 
both attended Harvard. 11 As one individual commented, "Roberts shared Friendly's capacity for 
hard work and devotion to the law."12 Judge Friendly was immediately impressed by Roberts, 
reportedly trusting the young lawyer after only one month and writing him a letter of 
recommendation for clerkships to the Supreme Court after such a short time." 13 While many 
details of John Roberts' time as Friendly's clerk are difficult to glean from the papers that 
remain, it is easy to surmise that Judge Friendly's approach to the bench would have great 
influence on John Roberts. As one commentator noted, "[f]rom Friendly, Roberts learned to take 
pride in judicial craftsmanship, to provide elaborate reasoning and bring intellectual rigor to each 
opinion, and to reason one's way to a result ... [i]n many ways, Friendly remains Roberts's 
intellectual ideal."14 Friendly himself had clerked for the one of the preeminent judicial minds of 
his own generation in Justice Brandeis before coming to the Second Circuit under the 
Eisenhower administration, where he was at times frustrated by what was in his view the judicial 
activism of the Warren Court. Furthermore, it was Judge Friendly who referred to the judge's 
9ld. 
1o Brad Snyder, The Judicial Genealogy (and Mytholog;,y) of John Roberts: Clerkships from 
Gray to Brandeis to Friendly to Roberts, 71 Ohio St. L.j.1149,1218 (2010). 
11ld....at 1216, 1218. 
lZld. at 1218. 
13 ld....at 1219. 
14 ld....at 1232. 
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role as that of an umpire in baseball; a refrain Roberts would later repeat in his confirmation 
h · IS eanngs. 
After clerking for Judge Friendly, John Roberts moved on to a clerkship for then Justice 
Rehnquist. Rehnquist, considered the preeminent conservative in his time, stood out among a 
liberal Court. As one writer put it, "In those days, Rehnquist ... was still "the Lone Ranger" intent 
on empowering the states at the expense of the federal government but usually without the votes 
to accomplish it."16 John Roberts was no different. According to another Supreme Court clerk 
who served at the same time as Roberts, "[Roberts'] was "a very solid, rigorous, coherent view 
of very important social questions ... about the relations between courts and legislatures, about the 
relationship between the federal government and the state, between the public sphere and the 
private.""17 According to the same article, the fifteen clerks interviewed "offered a revealing 
portrait of an affable, ambitious and frankly conservative intellectual, much like his boss."18 As 
the article notes however, little can be gleaned about Roberts' conservatism during his years a as 
clerk. It notes "[f]ew if any of the memorandums found ... from Mr. Roberts's clerkship shed 
much light on his politicalleanings ... [t]hey are, if anything, concise and reliant on procedural 
points."19 Just as he did while in school, John Roberts' intellect made him stand out from his 
peers while clerking for Justice Rehnquist. As the article points out "many [of the Supreme Court 
clerks] would go on to enormous professional success, particularly in the academy ... [b]ut even 
1s .l.d,_at 1234. 
16 .l.d,_at 1223. 
17 Adam Liptak, As Clerk for Rehnquist Nominee Stood Out for Conservative Rigor. New 
York Times Ouly 31, ZOOS) http:/ /www.nytimes.com/2005/07 /31/politics/-
politicsspecial1/31roberts.html. 
18 kL. 
19 kL. 
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in that group, Mr. Roberts stood out. "20 One of the things Chief Justice Roberts professed to have 
learned from Rehnquist was brevity. He once recalled that, "one thing I learned from him was, I 
hope, to try to write crisply and efficiently, that a lot of extra stuff could be dispensed with."21 
Roberts also picked up from Rehnquist that it was necessary to make time for his family in the 
. fl 22 practice o aw. 
Following his clerkship with Rehnquist, John Roberts embarked on illustrious career path. 
First, he served as Special Assistant to Attorney General William French Smith under the 
Reagan administration and then became associate White House Counsel before entering private 
practice at the DC firm Hogan and Hartson. 23 Roberts excelled in private practice; becoming 
partner just one year after starting and prevailing in his first argument before the Supreme Court 
in 1989. Roberts then moved on to become Principal Deputy Solicitor General in George H.W. 
Bush's White House. In 1993, he returned to private practice at Hogan and Hartson, where he 
stayed until2001 and won twenty-five of thirty-nine arguments before the Supreme Court?4 
Chief Justice Roberts was sworn into the DC Circuit in 2003, and then in 2005 was nominated 
and confirmed as Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court. 
III. Roberts' Judicial Opinions 
A. Prior to the Affordable Care Act Decision 
In the five to six years prior to his opinion in the Affordable Care Act decision, Chief 
Justice Roberts approach to the law became clear. Generally speaking, Roberts gives great 
weight to Court precedent but does not dogmatically adhere to it. He also has a deep respect for 
20 IlL. 
21 Snyder,~ at 1224. 
22 IlL. 
23 Id._at 1225, 1228. 
24 Id...at 1229, 1230. 
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the separation of powers and believes that the Court's role is limited, with judicial restrain being 
of primary importance. Roberts is also willing to look to the realities of a given statute and the 
effects of judicial decisions. Furthermore, his approach is detailed and often looks to rule as 
narrowly as possible. 
In Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006), the 
Chief Justice found that the Government failed to carry its burden under the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act (RFRA) to show that it had a compelling interest in prohibiting a small religious 
sect with origins in the Amazon Rainforest (UDV) from partaking in communion by drinking a 
sacramental tea containing a substance regulated under the Controlled Substances Act (hoasca).25 
In this early case, Chief Justice Roberts uses precedent to form his opinion and undercut 
the argument put forth by the Government without strictly limiting it to the facts of a case. He 
finds the Government's argument is foreclosed by the Court's decision in Ashscroft v. American 
Civil Liberties Union, 542 U.S. 656 (2004).26 Roberts declines to limit Ashcroft to its facts as the 
Government argues he should, finding instead that although "[t]he fact that Ashcroft involved [a 
content based restriction on speech] was the reason the Government had the burden of proof at 
trial under the First Amendment, [that] in no way affected the Court's assessment of the 
consequences of having that burden for purposes of the preliminary injunction" and "[h ]ere 
[while] the burden is placed ... on the Government by RFRA rather than the First 
Amendment...the consequences are the same."27 Additionally, Roberts does not find the 
25 Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418,423 (2006) 
26 In that case, the Court reasoned that "as the Government bears the burden of proof on the 
ultimate question of [the challenged Act's] constitutionality, respondents [the movants] must be 
deemed likely to prevail unless the Government has shown that respondents' proposed less 
restrictive alternatives are less effective than [enforcing the Act]." 546 U.S. 418 at 429 
27 546 U.S. 418 at 429,430. 
7 
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Government's use of older cases persuasive. He writes that "[t]hose cases did not embrace the 
notion that a general interest in uniformity justified a substantial burden on religious exercise; 
they instead scrutinized the asserted need and explained why the denied exemptions could not be 
accommodated. "28 
Roberts places RFRA's compelling interest standard in line with precedent set forth by 
Sherbert v. Verner and Wisconsin v. Yoder. He highlights that in those cases the "Court looked 
beyond broadly formulated interests justifYing the general applicability of government mandates 
and scrutinized the asserted harm of granting specific exemptions to particular 
religious claimants."29 He writes that, "there is no indication that Congress, in classifYing 
DMT, considered the harms posed by the particular use at issue here" and furthermore, that 
"Congress' determination that DMT should be listed under Schedule I simply does not provide a 
categorical answer that relieves the Government of the obligation to shoulder its burden under 
RFRA."30 It seems that in this case he believes precedential value is not limited to a case's facts 
but applies to its reasoning. So that reasoning on different facts can be used nonetheless as long 
as that reasoning can be applied in a consistent and particularized marmer. 
Also seen in Gonzalez is the Chief Justice's approach in dealing with statutes. Roberts 
relies on text and purpose in applying RFRA, but allows common sense to color its application. 
Reading the statute, Roberts finds that, "RFRA requires a more focused approach in which "the 
Government [must] demonstrate that the compelling interest test is satisfied through application 
of the challenged law to ... the particular claimant whose sincere exercise of religion is being 
2s 546 U.S. 418 at 435. 
29 546 U.S. 418 at 431. 
30 546 U.S. 418 at 432. 
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substantially burdened.',31 Roberts also looks to the way in which RFRA came to be, stating that, 
"Congress's express decision to legislate the compelling interest test indicates that RFRA 
challenges should be adjudicated in the same manner as constitutionally mandated applications 
of the test."32 
Furthermore, looking to the provisions of the CSA, he finds that it contains a provision 
the would allow the Attorney General to exempt certain people from its requirements and to the 
fact that an exemption to the CSA for the use of peyote by certain Native American tribes has 
existed for 35 years.33 Applying his common sense, Roberts writes that, "[i]f such use is 
permitted in the face of the congressional findings in § 812(b )(1) for hundreds of thousands of 
Native Americans practicing their faith, it is difficult to see how those same findings alone can 
preclude any consideration of a similar exception for the 130 or so American members of the 
UDV who want to practice theirs."34 Roberts states that, "RFRA ... plainly contemplates 
that courts would recognize exceptions -- that is how the law works" and that it "makes clear that 
it is the obligation of the courts to consider whether exceptions are required under the test set 
forth by Congress."35 
Proof of the Chief Justice's desire for limited, particularized decisions can be seen in a 
case decided in the same year as Gonzalez. In Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 (2006), 
Roberts dissented because he found the standard created by the majority in enforcing the 4th 
Amendment rights of a homeowner far too unclear. He writes that "[the majority's rule] does not 
implement the high office of the Fourth Amendment to protect privacy, but instead provides 
31 546 U.S. 418 at 430,431. 
32 546 U.S. 418 at 430. 
33ld. 
34 !d. 
35ld. 
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protection on a random and happenstance basis"36 According to Roberts, the Majority's position 
creates an exception that distorts an otherwise clear rule culled from the Court's precedent. He 
writes, "that the rule is so random in its application confirms that it bears no real relation to the 
privacy protected by the Fourth Amendment," but rather, "[w]hat the majority's rule protects is 
not so much privacy as the good luck of a co-owner who just happens to be present at the door 
when the police arrive. "37 He believes that, "[ r ]ather than draw such random and happenstance 
lines ... the more reasonable approach is to adopt a rule acknowledging that shared living space 
entails a limited yielding of privacy to others, and that the law historically permits those to whom 
we have yielded our privacy to in turn cooperate with the government. ,,3g 
What is more, according to Roberts, is that the Majority bases its opinion on the social 
expectation that when people who live together disagree over the use of their space, a resolution 
must come through voluntary accommodation?9 He writes, "[ t ]he possible scenarios are 
limitless, and slight variations in the fact pattern yield vastly different expectations ... [ s ]uch 
shifting expectations are not a promising foundation on which to ground a constitutional rule, 
particularly because the majority has no support for its basic assumption ... beyond a hunch about 
how people would typically act in an atypical situation.'.4° Roberts' desire for particularized 
inquiries requires that the Court base its approach on strong evidence rather than the type of 
shifting social considerations used by the Majority in this case. 
36 Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 127 (2006). 
37 547 U.S. 103 at 137. 
38 .1.!.1.. 
39 547 U.S. 103 at 129. 
40 547 U.S. 103 at 130. 
10 
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In Roberts' view the Court's prior cases established that co-occupants assume the risk 
that one or the other may share access to their information, papers, or places.41 Therefore, 
"someone who shares a place with another cannot interpose an objection when that person 
decides to grant access to the police, simply because the objecting individual happens to be 
present."42 Roberts writes that "In fllinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177. 110 S. Ct. 2793, Ill L. 
Ed. 2d 148 (1990), this Court stated that "[w]hat [a person] is assured by the Fourth 
Amendment ... is not that no government search of his house will occur unless he consents; but 
that no such search will occur that is 'unreasonable" and that one element that can make such a 
search reasonable is voluntary consent. "43 He finds further support in 
United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974).44 Furthermore, Roberts' review of precedent 
reveals that the Court has not looked to such expectations in deciding questions of consent in 
similar cases. 45 He notes that, "the social expectations concept has not been applied to all 
questions arising under the Fourth Amendment, least of all issues of consent.'"'6 
Roberts disagrees with the majority's suggestion that "widely shared social expectations 
are a constant element in assessing Fourth Amendment reasonableness" because the cases cited 
by the majority refer to a legitimate expectation of privacy, and this, in his view, is not the social 
expectation the majority is attempting to protect with its decision in Georgia v. Randolph. 47 
Citing United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 107 (1984) Roberts writes that, "[i]ftwo friends 
41 547 U.S. 103 at 128. 
42 !d. 
43 !d. 
44 This case found that,"[ a] warrantless search is reasonable if police obtain the voluntary 
consent of a person authorized to give it ... [c]o-occupants have "assumed the risk that one of 
their number might permit [a] common area to be searched." I d. 
45 !d. 
46 .!.d. 
47 547 U.S. 103 at 131. 
11 
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share a locker and one keeps contraband inside, he might trust that his friend will not let others 
look inside ... [b]ut by sharing private space, privacy has "already been frustrated" with respect to 
the locker-mate.'.48 Roberts believes that prior cases reflect the understanding that"[ a] wide 
variety of often subtle social conventions may shape expectations about how we act when 
another shares with us what is otherwise private ... [t]he Constitution, however, protects not these 
but privacy, and once privacy has been shared, the shared information, documents, or places 
remain private only at the discretion of the confidant."49 He also cites Unite States v. White. 5° 
The same analysis was used in Frazier v. Cuw, 394 U.S. 731 (1969) to cover a jointly used 
duffle bag and in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971) to common areas where one 
inhabitant held contraband and the other delivered it to the Police. 51 
Roberts believes that the majority is altering established Fourth Amendment rules to 
justify their position and creates a new "consent plus good reason" rule. 52 Roberts further thinks 
that the majority's bending and twisting is all for very little. He states that, "[c]onsidering the 
majority's rule is solely concerned with protecting a person who happens to be present at the 
door when a police officer asks his co-occupant for consent to search, but not one who is asleep 
in the next room or in the backyard gardening, the majority has taken a great deal of pain in 
altering Fourth Amendment doctrine, for precious little (if any) gain in privacy."53 Roberts then 
concludes that "[t]he end result is a complete lack of practical guidance for the police in the field, 
48 ld. 
49 kl. 
so According to Roberts, here the Court held that one speaker to a conversation can consent to 
government eavesdropping and the entire conversation will be admissible because the risk that 
one coconspirator is reporting back to the police is inherent in the contemplation of illegal 
activities. 547 U.S. 103, 132. 
s1 547 U.S. 103 at 132, 133. 
52 ld. 
sJ 547 U.S. 103 at 141. 
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let alone for the lower courts."54 Roberts belies the Majority's use of precedent as missing the 
mark, or worse, distorting it to fit their position. 
In his short concurrence in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange. L.L.C., 547 US 388 (2006) the 
Chief Justice agrees with the majority's decision that the District Courts have equitable 
discretion over whether to grant or deny injunctive relief, and that discretion must be exercised 
consistent with established principles of equity. He writes separately however to emphasize his 
concern that the Court align its decision with its historical practices. He states that "[f]rom at 
least the early 19th century, courts have granted injunctive relief upon a finding of infringement 
in the vast majority of patent cases."55 Roberts also looks to highlight his belief that while the 
Court does have discretion in these matters, that discretion has limits and should be used with an 
eye to the Court's prior decisions. He writes that "there is a difference between exercising 
equitable discretion pursuant to the established four-factor test and writing on an entirely clean 
slate" and furthermore, that "[w]hen it comes to discerning and applying those standards, in this 
area as others, "a page of history is worth a volume oflogic."56 
In FEC v. Wis. Right to Life. Inc., 551 U.S. 449 (2007), Chief Justice Roberts found that 
Wisconsin Right to Life Speech's ad was not functionally equivalent to campaign speech and 
that§ 203 of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) was unconstitutional as-applied here 
and in similar cases. 57 Roberts first deals with the initial issue of whether the court can hear the 
case over the FEC's argument that it was now moot. He agrees with the District Court in finding 
54 547 U.S. 103 at 142. 
55 eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 US 388, 395 (2006). 
56l.d. 
57 FEC v. Wis. Right to Life. Inc., 551 U.S. 449,457 (2007). 
13 
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that an established exception to mootness applied. 58 Roberts found that it was enough that 
Wisconsin Right to Life "credibly claimed that it planned on running "'materially similar"' future 
targeted broadcast ads mentioning a candidate within the blackout period and there is no reason 
to believe that the FEC will "refrain from prosecuting violations" ofBCRA."59 
Roberts explains that strict scrutiny applies in this case, so "the Government must prove 
that applying BCRA to WRTL's ads furthers a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to 
achieve that interest" and the Courts approach is informed by precedent.60 The Chief Justice 
turns to McConnell v. Federal Election Comm'n. 540 U.S. 93, (2003) and analyzes its import to 
the present case. He notes that the McConnell court relied upon fact specific studies that used the 
language of intent and effect. He found that, "[t]the Court's assessment was accordingly phrased 
in the same terms, which the Court regarded as sufficient to conclude, on the record before it, 
that the plaintiffs had not "carried their heavy burden of proving" that § 203 was facially 
overbroad and could not be enforced in any circumstances."61 Roberts finds that this effectively 
closeted the Court's discussion in McConnell to that particular case and did not bind the Court to 
use that same standard as the constitutional test to be used in separating banned political speech 
from protected political speech. 
58 Roberts agrees with the District Court's finding that the case fits within an exception to 
mootness for disputes capable of repetition, yet evading review. The first prong, "the challenged 
action is in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to cessation or expiration" is met 
because, as Roberts, citing the District Court's decision, writes "it would be "entirely 
unreasonable ... to expect that [WRTL] could have obtained complete judicial review of its 
claims in time for it to air its ads" during the BCRA blackout periods." The second prong, that 
"there is a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party will be subject to the same 
action again" was met even though the Roberts found it was too much of the FEC to ask WRTL 
to prove that they will run ads in the future sharing all the legally relevant characteristics. 551 
U.S. 449 at 460. 
59 551 U.S. 449 at 463. 
Go 551 U.S. 449 at 464, 465. 
61J.d. 
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Additionally, he finds the methodology used by the Court in McConnell suspect, noting 
that there was serious dispute among the district judges over the two studies, and that "[ n ]othing 
in this Court's opinion in McConnell suggests it was resolving the sharp disagreements about the 
evidentiary record in this respect."62 The precedential value of McConnell is therefore 
undermined because there was not a consensus as to the methodology used by the court that 
could form a solid foundation for future decisions. More importantly for Roberts however, the 
Court had rejected such an approach in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).63 He writes, 
"the Buckley Court explained that analyzing the question in terms "'of intent and of effect"' 
would afford "'no security for free discussion."64 Therefore, the test used by the Court framed in 
such turns, even though a decision more recent that Buckley had done so. Roberts would like the 
test to be clearer and provide a more readily ascertainable standard. He finds that "[t]he test to 
distinguish constitutionally protected political speech from speech that BCRA may proscribe 
should provide a safe harbor for those who wish to exercise First Amendment rights. "65 In 
Roberts' view, the proper test cannot rely on subjective considerations of intent and effect. 
Rather, "the proper standard for an as-applied challenge to BCRA § 203 must be objective, 
focusing on the substance of the communication rather than amorphous considerations of intent 
and effect. "66 
Roberts finds that the appellant's argument for an expansive definition of what it means 
to be functionally equivalent does not fit within the standard required by strict scrutiny. 
Appellants argued that such a broad definition is "needed to ensure that issue advocacy does not 
62 551 U.S. 449 at 467, footnote 4. 
63 .!J;!. 
64 .!J;!. 
65 .!J;!. 
66 551 U.S. 449 at 469. 
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circumvent the rule against express advocacy, which in tum helps protect against circumvention 
of the rule against contributions."67 According to the Chief Justice however, "such a prophylaxis-
upon-prophylaxis approach to regulating expression is not consistent with strict scrutiny."68 
Before ending his opinion, Roberts makes sure to cite the language of the First 
Amendment. He writes that"[ o ]ur jurisprudence over the past 216 years has rejected an 
absolutist interpretation of those words, but when it comes to drawing difficult lines in the area 
of pure political speech--between what is protected and what the Government may ban--it is 
worth recalling the language we are applying."69 He further writes that "when it comes to 
defining what speech qualifies as the functional equivalent of express advocacy subject to such a 
ban ... we give the benefit of the doubt to speech, not censorship ... [t]he First Amendment's 
command that "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech" demands at 
least that."70 
Chief Justice Roberts filed a concurring opinion in Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 
(2010) in which he agreed with the majority's decision to protect the first amendment rights of 
corporations and their approach, but highlighted his concern for the principles of judicial 
restraint and stare decisis.71 Justice Roberts writes that "[t]he majority's step-by-step 
analysis accords with our standard practice of avoiding broad constitutional questions except 
when necessary."72 In his view, the Court properly rejected Citizens United's statutory claim first 
before moving on to the constitutional issues. Roberts notes that, "[i]t is only because the 
67 551 U.S. 449 at 479. 
68ld. 
69 551 U.S. 449 at 482. 
70 J.d. 
n Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310,373 (2010). 
n 558 U.S. 310 at 374. 
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majority rejects Citizens United's statutory claim that it proceeds to consider the group's various 
constitutional arguments, beginning with its narrowest claim ... and proceeding to its broadest."73 
Addressing the Dissent's argument, which he finds "quite perplexing," Roberts writes 
that they must be in agreement as to the need to reach the broad constitutional issue because they 
do not argue that Citizens United should lose on narrower grounds 74. Roberts observes however 
that,"[d]espite agreeing that these narrower arguments fail...the dissent argues that the majority 
should nonetheless latch on to one of them in order to avoid reaching the broader constitutional 
question of whether Austin remains good law."75 In his view, the dissent is asking the court to 
embrace a narrow decision on less than meritorious grounds in order to avoid what they believe 
to be an unnecessary constitutional holding. As the Chief Justice notes, "[i]t should go without 
saying, however, that we cannot embrace a narrow ground of decision simply because it is 
narrow; it must also be right." 76 
According to Roberts, what is causing the Court consternation in this case is the Austin v. 
Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (U.S. 1990) decision. The Dissent points to 
decisions since Austin that in their view re-affirmed that decision but as Robert notes, in none of 
the cases cited by the Dissent did the Court deal with a direct challenge to Austin, so at most the 
Court simply did not overturn it in those cases. According to Roberts, "[t[he Court's 
unwillingness to overturn Austin in those cases cannot be understood as a reaffirmation of that 
decision." 77 
73 .!.d. 
74 558 U.S. 310 at 375. 
75 !d. 
76J.d. 
n 558 U.S. 310 at 377. 
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Turning again to the principal of stare decisis, Roberts writes "[f]idelity to precedent. . .is 
vital to the proper exercise of the judicial function .. .it promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and 
consistent development oflegal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes 
to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process." 78 He notes however that it is not an 
immutable rule but a "principle of policy" that while urging the Court to rule in consistent ways, 
allows the Court to overturn decisions that are clearly incorrect or outdated.79 He writes, "[i]ts 
greatest purpose is to serve a constitutional ideal-- the rule oflaw ... [i]t follows that in the 
unusual circumstance when fidelity to any particular precedent does more to damage this 
constitutional ideal than to advance it, we must be more willing to depart from that precedent."80 
The Chief Justice provides two examples in which dogmatic adherence to stare decisis would be 
detrimental to the rule of law. The first scenario is where recently decided precedent fails to 
conform to the Court's broader jurisprudence and the second instance the Chief Justice points to 
is that in which adhering to a particular precedent disrupts the "stable and orderly adjudication of 
future cases."81 
Chief Justice Roberts believes that Austin should be overturned because it fits into both 
of the above scenarios. He notes that, "as the majority explains, that decision was an "aberration" 
insofar as it departed from the robust protections we had granted political speech in our earlier 
cases" and that Austin specifically undermined the Buckley decision rejecting the government's 
interest in regulating independent political expenditures. 82 
78 ld. 
79 558 U.S. 310 at 378. 
8o I d. 
81 558 U.S. 310 at 378, 379. 
82lil. 
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Roberts also notes that Austin was decided with two dissenting opinions. He writes that 
Austin "has proved to be the consistent subject of dispute among Members of this Court" and 
that this "undermine[ s] the precedent's ability to contribute to the stable and orderly development 
of the law ."83 Roberts also recognizes that Austin's import is much broader than prior precedent; 
"the Austin decision is uniquely destabilizing because it threatens to subvert our Court's 
decisions even outside the particular context of corporate express advocacy."84 Roberts 
admonishes the Dissent for taking such an expansive view of Austin but see this as the logical 
conclusion to be reached from that decision's logic. He writes that, "[b ]ecause Austin is so 
difficult to confme to its facts -- and because its logic threatens to undermine our First 
Amendment jurisprudence and the nature of public discourse more broadly -- the costs of giving 
it stare decisis effect are unusually high."85 Roberts concludes by reviewing the Government's 
arguments for upholding Austin. He notes that the Government does not invoke the compelling 
interest relied upon in Austin but asks the Court to rule on two potentially expansive grounds 
never previously brought before the Court. He notes, "[t] hose interests may or may not support 
the result in Austin, but they were plainly not part of the reasoning on which Austin relied."86 
Roberts goes on to say that "[t]here is therefore no basis for the Court to give precedential sway 
to reasoning that it has never accepted, simply because that reasoning happens to support a 
conclusion reached on different grounds that have since been abandoned or discredited."87 To do 
so, according to Roberts, "would undermine the rule-of-law values that justify stare decisis."88 
83 558 U.S. 310 at 380. 
84 !d. 
85 558 U.S. 310 at 382. 
86 558 U.S. 310 at 383. 
87 558 U.S. 310 at 384. 
88 M. 
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In Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012) the Chief Justice disagrees with the 
Majority's decision that the Eight Amendment to the Constitution prevents the Court from 
upholding mandatory life sentences without parole for two fourteen year-olds convicted of 
murder. In his view, "the Court invokes [the Eight Amendment] to ban a punishment that the 
Court does not itself characterize as unusual, and that could not plausibly be described as 
such."89 Looking at current statistics, Roberts notes that the parties agree that 2500 prisoners are 
serving life sentences without parole for crimes committed before the age of eighteen, and that 
the Court recognizes that many of those sentences resulted from mandatory sentencing 
guidelines. 90 
Roberts also fmds support for his position in the Court's precedent. In his view, the cases 
established that "[w]hen determining whether a punishment is cruel and unusual, this Court 
typically begins with" 'objective indicia of society's standards, as expressed in legislative 
enactments and state practice."91 The purpose of the objective standards is to ensure that the 
Court does not use subjective values or beliefs when determining whether a particular 
punishment is creel and unusual.92 According to Roberts, the purpose of using such "tangible 
evidence" is that it "enables us to determine whether there is a "consensus against" a given 
. . ["]fth . th . hm b d d " ual ""93 Furth sentencmg practice ... 1 ere 1s, e pun1s ent may e regar e as unus . ermore, 
Roberts believes that stare decisis asks the Court to look to the "evolving standards of decency 
that mark the progress of a maturing society. "94 He notes however that decency does not 
B9 Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455,2477 (2012). 
90jg. 
91ld. 
92 132 S. Ct. 2455 at 2478. 
93 M. 
94l.d. 
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necessarily mean leniency, and that "[a]s judges we have no basis for deciding that 
progress toward greater decency can move only in the direction of easing sanctions on the 
guilty."95 
Roberts then turns to the Majority's use of Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (U.S. 2010, 
finding that they misstate its impact. According to Roberts, the majority believes that because 
Graham found a sentence available in 39 states unconstitutional and the sentence involved here is 
only available in 10 states, that Graham provides support for their finding. However, as Roberts 
points out, the reason the Court in Graham found the sentence unconstitutional was because 
while it was indeed available in 39 states, its actual use was exceedingly rare and so there was a 
national consensus against its use.96 In this case, he finds no such consensus against the sentence 
at issue. Roberts also fails to understand why the majority disregards the numbers involved in 
both Graham and the present case. He thinks the majority is "claiming that the prevalence of the 
sentence in question results from the number of statutes requiring its imposition" and "excuses 
the high number of actual sentences by citing the high number of statutes imposing it. "97 In his 
view however "[t]o say that a sentence may be considered unusual because so many legislatures 
approve it stands precedent on its head.'m 
Roberts next turns to the majority's argument that in some states, the life sentence 
without parole comes to be as the result of the interaction of two laws that allow minors to be 
tried as adults and imposes a life sentence on those convicted of murder, so therefore the 
sentence at issue may arise inadvertently. He writes that "the widespread and recent imposition 
95ld. 
96 132 S. Ct. 2455 at 2478, 2479. 
97 132 S. Ct. 2455 at 2479. 
98ld. 
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of the sentence makes it implausible to characterize this sentencing practice as a collateral 
consequence oflegislative ignorance."99 Additionally, Roberts writes "we [do not] display our 
usual respect for elected officials by asserting that legislators have accidentally required 2,000 
teenagers to spend the rest of their lives injaii."100 
Roberts admonishes the majority for not showing restraint in its decision. He writes, 
"[i]ndeed, the Court's opinion suggests that it is merely a way station on the path to further 
judicial displacement of the legislative role in prescribing appropriate punishment for crime."101 
He further believes that although the majority focused on the mandatory nature of the sentencing, 
they left the door open to expand its reasoning. He believes that the "Court has already 
announced that discretionary life without parole for juveniles should be "uncommon" and that 
this "appears to be nothing other than an invitation to overturn life without parole sentences 
imposed by juries and trial judges," beginning a "process [with] no discemable end point."102 
Roberts fmishes by stating that "[ u ]nless confined, the only stopping point for the Court's 
analysis would be never permitting juvenile offenders to be tried as adults ... [!]earning that an 
Amendment that bars only "unusual" punishments requires the abolition of this uniformly 
established practice would be startling indeed."103 
A number of aspects of Roberts' judicial approach are clear from the above sampling. 
Firstly, as seen throughout these cases, he looks to precedent to bolster his positions and also to 
undercut reasoning he disagrees with. For Roberts though, while the principle of stare decisis is 
central to the proper function of the Court, it gives way when reason dictates; similar to the way 
99 132 S. Ct. 2455 at 2480. 
100 ld. 
1o1 132 S. Ct. 2455 at 2481. 
102ld. 
1o3 132 S. Ct. 2455 at 2482. 
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the Chief Justice was described as believing "in having some humility about one's ability to 
suddenly decree that those who came before you were wrong, but he was not a stick in the mud 
either.'' 104 Additionally, also seen in the above cases is Roberts' insistence on approaching the 
issues before the court in as narrow a manner possible, leading him to only deal with the merits 
of litigation only after finding the Court is right to do so and only reaching Constitutional issues 
when it is necessary to go so far. Stemming from this is Roberts respect for both the separation 
of powers and federalism, leading him to ensure that the Court stays within its powers and to 
show respect for the other branches and states. This concern also leads Roberts to look for 
particularized rather than general arguments; a goal, which crops up in both his own arguments 
and his analysis of the arguments of other Justices and the parties before the Court. The same 
further leads him to look at the facts and circumstances of legislative acts, including their history, 
and effects of the Court's decisions because he believes that the way in which a decision plays 
out, if discernible, points to whether the Court has properly narrowed its considerations. Finally, 
as just alluded to above, Roberts, history major in college and clerk to a history loving Judge 
Friendly, keeps an eye towards history and pulls in historical text when appropriate. 
B. The Affordable Care Act Decision 
In Nat') Fed'n oflndep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012), Chief Justice Roberts 
found the Affordable Care Act's (ACA) individual mandate was Constitutionally valid under 
Congress' power to tax. Roberts makes his deference to Congress clear by stating that "[ o )ur 
permissive reading of these powers is explained in part by a general reticence to invalidate the 
acts of the Nation's elected leaders."105 Furthermore, "[p]roper respect for a coordinate branch of 
104 See fn. 9, SJ.!.!;!@. 
10s Nat') Fed'n oflndep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566,2579 (2012). 
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the government" requires the Court to strike down an act of Congress only if "the lack of 
constitutional authority to pass [the] act in question is clearly demonstrated.""106 He warns 
however that, "[ o ]ur deference in matters of policy carmot. .. become abdication in matters of 
law."107 According to Roberts, Constitutionality is not affected by "circumstances of the 
moment" and it is the province of the Court to strike down laws that exceed the limits on 
Congress' power. 108 
Before reaching the merits of the case, Roberts analyzes whether Court has the authority 
to proceed, given the Anti-Injunction Act. The Anti-Injunction Act effectively requires that all 
challenges to a tax to be held only after the tax at issue has been paid and because the ACA's 
penalty for not complying with the individual mandate is treated as a tax by the IRS, it was 
argued that the Anti-Injunction Act bars the suit before the Court. Roberts however feels that the 
text of the statute means something different. He recognizes that the Anti-Injunction Act covers 
any tax, but contends that Congress labeled the shared responsibility payment as a penalty and 
not a tax. He then writes that, "[t]here is no inunediate reason to think that a statute applying to 
"any tax" would apply to a "penalty.""109 Roberts finds it significant that Congress described 
many other parts of the ACA as a tax. He contends that, "[w]here Congress uses certain language 
in one part of a statute and different language in another, it is generally presumed that Congress 
. . all ,110 acts mtent10n y. 
Additionally, Roberts does not agree with the amicus' other argument that the IRC 
§6201(a) requires courts to treat the penalty as a tax under the Anti-Injunction Act because that 
106ld. 
107 !d. 
1os 132 S. Ct. 2566 at 2579, 2580. 
109 132 S. Ct. 2566 at 2583. 
110 !d. 
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section includes assessable penalties as taxes. He thinks this misses the mark because it is valid 
only if §6201(a) is read in isolation and many other sections of the IRC that treat penalties apart 
from taxes are ignored. Roberts concludes that "(i]n light of the Code's consistent distinction 
between the terms "tax" and "assessable penalty," we must accept the Government's 
interpretation: §6201(a) instructs the Secretary that his authority to assess taxes includes the 
authority to assess penalties, but it does not equate assessable penalties to taxes for other 
purposes."111 Only because the ACA does not require the penalty to be treated as a tax for 
purposes of the Anti-Injunction Act, does Roberts find that the Court can proceed to the merits of 
the case. 
Roberts addresses the Government's argument that the individual mandate is a proper 
exercise of Congress' power under the Commerce Clause. In rejecting this argument, Roberts 
found that "Congress has never attempted to rely on that power to compel individuals not 
engaged in commerce to purchase an unwanted product."112 He further writes that "[l]egislative 
novelty is not necessarily fatal; there is a first time for everything ... [b]ut sometimes "the most 
telling indication of [a] severe constitutional problem ... is the lack of historical precedent" for 
Congress's action.''" 3 He reads the Commerce Clause as presupposing the existence the activity 
to be regulated but not the ability to create the activity. Roberts writes that "[t]he language of the 
Constitution reflects the natural understanding that the power to regulate assumes there is already 
something to be regulated."114 Turning to past Commerce Clause cases, Roberts finds little to 
support the Government's positions. He states that "[a]s expansive as our cases construing the 
111 1132 S. Ct. 2566 at 2584 
112 132 S. Ct. 2566 at 2586. 
113 I d. 
114 .!.d. 
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scope of the commerce power have been, they all have one thing in common: They uniformly 
describe the power as reaching "activity.""115 He believes this to mean that the activity must be 
in existence before it can be regulated under the Commerce Clause. 
Additionally, Roberts finds that the Court's precedent may recognize that Congress can 
regulate classes of activities, but "not classes of individuals, apart from the activity in which they 
are engaged."116 He rejects the government's argument that this distinction does not matter. The 
Chief Justice writes that, "(t]he proposition that Congress may dictate the conduct of an 
individual today because of prophesied future activity finds no support in our precedent."117 In 
his view, while the Court has found that Congress may anticipate the effects of a particular 
activity to be regulated, "we have never permitted Congress to anticipate that activity itself in 
order to regulate individuals not currently engaged in commerce ... [ e ]ach one of our 
cases .. .involved preexisting economic activity."118 Furthermore, if such a power exists in any 
body, it is with the states, not the federal government. Roberts writes that, "(t]he Commerce 
Clause is not a general license to regulate an individual from cradle to grave, simply because he 
will predictably engage in particular transactions ... (a]ny police power to regulate individuals as 
such ... remains vested in the States."119 
Roberts then turns to the government's Necessary and Proper Clause argument, which he 
also rejects. Roberts thinks the government's Necessary and Proper Clause argument goes too far. 
He finds that "[e)ach of our prior cases upholding laws under that Clause involved exercises of 
authority derivative of, and in service to, a granted power. .. (t]he individual mandate, by contrast, 
11s 132 S. Ct. 2566 at 2587. 
116 132 S. Ct. 2566 at 2590. 
117l.d. 
118l.d. 
119 132 S. Ct. 2566 at 2591. 
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vests Congress with the extraordinary ability to create the necessary predicate to the exercise of 
an enumerated power."120 Roberts asserts that this authority is neither narrow in scope nor 
incidental to the Connnerce Clause, and concludes that, "[ e ]ven if the individual mandate is 
"necessary" to the Act's insurance reforms, such an expansion of federal power is not a "proper" 
means for making those reforms effective."121 
Having determined that neither the Connnerce Clause nor the Necessary and Proper 
clause justifY the individual mandate, Chief Justice Roberts turns to the government's third 
argument that the mandate is appropriate under Congress' taxation powers. Looking at 180 year 
old precedent, he writes that "it is well established that if a statute has two [or more] possible 
meanings, one of which violates the Constitution, courts should adopt the meaning that does 
not."122 Therefore, "it is ... necessary to ask whether the Government's alternative reading of the 
statute--that it only imposes a tax on those without insurance--is a reasonable one."123 He finds 
that "[ t ]he exaction the Affordable Care Act imposes on those without health insurance looks 
like a tax in many respects."124 Additionally, while "[i]t is up to Congress whether to apply the 
Anti-Injunction Act to any particular statute, so it makes sense to be guided by Congress's choice 
of label on that question ... [t]hat choice does not, however, control whether an exaction is within 
Congress's constitutional power to tax." 125 
Roberts looks to precedent, which in his view creates a functional approach to 
determining whether something is within Congress' power to tax. After culling a number of 
12o 132 S. Ct. 2566 at 2592. 
121J.d. 
122 132 S. Ct. 2566 at 2593. 
123ld. 
124 132 S. Ct. 2566 at 2594. 
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important factors from the Court's prior cases, Roberts fmds that the individual mandate has 
many characteristics of a tax. 126 Roberts then looks to the penalty versus tax distinction, finding 
that the "Court has explained that "if the concept of penalty means anything, it means 
punishment for an unlawful act or omission.""127 He finds however, that "[w]hile the individual 
mandate clearly aims to induce the purchase of health insurance, it need not be read to declare 
that failing to do so is unlawful."128 
Roberts next notes that it is estimated that up to four million people will choose to pay 
the charge rather than become insured, and finds that, "that Congress apparent! y regards such 
extensive failure to comply with the mandate as tolerable suggests that Congress did not think it 
was creating four million outlaws" but instead "[i]t suggests ... that the shared responsibility 
payment merely imposes a tax citizens may lawfully choose to pay in lieu of buying health 
insurance."129 Roberts places the Court's machinations in this case in line with its prior reasoning 
in New York v. United State; stating that there is" no insurmountable obstacle to a similar 
approach here."130 In that case, the Court rejected an argument similar to the one posed by the 
plaintiffs in this case, that "Congress's choice oflanguage--stating that individuals "shall" obtain 
insurance or pay a "penalty"--requires reading §5000A as punishing unlawful conduct, even if 
that interpretation would render the law unconstitutional."131 
Roberts then turns to the plaintiffs argument that the shared responsibility payment, if it 
is a tax, is a direct tax and so must be apportioned in accordance with Art. I §9 Clause 4 of the 
126 132 S. Ct. 2566 at 2596. 
127 ill. 
12s 132 S. Ct. 2566 at 2596, 2597. 
129 132 S. Ct. 2566 at 2597. 
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Constitution. He looks back to the writing of Constitution, stating that, "[ e ]ven when the Direct 
Tax Clause was written it was unclear what else, other than a capitation (also known as a "head 
tax" or a "poll tax"), might be a direct tax."132 Looking at court decisions from that time, Roberts 
finds that "those Justices who wrote opinions either directly asserted or strongly suggested that 
only two forms of taxation were direct: capitations and land taxes."133 He then notes that while 
the definition of a direct tax did expand since the founding, "[a] tax on going without health 
insurance does not fall within any recognized category of direct tax." 134 He concludes that "[t]he 
Federal Government does not have the power to order people to buy health insurance ... [ s ]ection 
5000A would therefore be unconstitutional if read as a command" but "[t]he Federal 
Government does have the power to impose a tax on those without health insurance" 
thus "[s]ection 5000A is ... constitutional, because it can reasonably be read as a tax."135 
Roberts then turns to the Medicaid expansion issue also before the court. Roberts finds 
that while the Court's Spending Clause cases "have long recognized that Congress may use this 
power to grant federal funds to the States, and may condition such a grant upon the States' 
"taking certain actions that Congress could not require them to take," that there are "limits on 
Congress's power under the Spending Clause to secure state compliance with federal 
objectives."136 This insight and the Court's precedent have led the "Court to strike down federal 
legislation that commandeers a State's legislative or administrative apparatus for federal 
purposes."137 
132 132 S. Ct. 2566 at 2598. 
133 .!.d. 
134 132 S. Ct. 2566 at 2599. 
m 132 S. Ct. 2566 at 260 I. 
136 132 S. Ct. 2566 at 2602. 
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For Roberts, the key consideration in this area is federalism. As he writes, "[p ]ermitting 
the Federal Government to force the States to implement a federal program would threaten the 
political accountability key to our federal system."138 He further notes that "Spending Clause 
programs do not pose this danger when a State has a legitimate choice whether to accept the 
federal conditions in exchange for federal funds." 139 Roberts however, agrees with the states' 
contention that "[i]nstead of simply refusing to grant the new funds to States that will not accept 
the new conditions, Congress has also threatened to withhold those States' existing Medicaid 
funds." 140 Prior cases established that a financial inducement in connection with a federal 
program may not rise above "relatively mild encouragement."141 According to Roberts, "the 
financial "inducement" Congress has chosen is much more than "relatively mild 
encouragement" --it is a gun to the head."142 This is so because if a state refuses to participate in 
the expansion, the Federal government will take away all Medicaid funding, not just the 
additional funding made available under the A CA. 
The final item considered is what effect the Court's holding has on the rest of the ACA. 
When answering this question, Roberts suggests that the Court looks to what Congress would 
have wanted, writing that "our "touchstone for any decision about remedy is legislative intent, 
for a court cannot use its remedial powers to circumvent the intent of the legislature."143 Roberts 
writes that "as a practical matter ... States may now choose to reject the expansion; that is the 
138 !d. 
139 132 S. Ct. 2566 at 2603. 
140 !d. 
141 132 S. Ct. 2566 at 2604. 
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whole point ... [b]ut that does not mean all or even any will."144 He concludes by finding that, 
"[w]e do not believe Congress would have wanted the whole Act to fall, simply because some 
may choose not to participate" since "[t]he other reforms Congress enacted, after all, will remain 
"fully operative as a law," and will still function in a way "consistent with Congress' basic 
objectives in enacting the statute.""145 
John Roberts' opinion in the above case does mirror his approach as seen in the earlier 
cases in a number of ways. First, he deals with the issue of whether the Court can hear the case in 
the first place given the Anti-Injunction Act, and finding that it does not apply only then does he 
move on to the greater constitutional questions. In so doing, Roberts more or less says that 
Congress, as it did in Miller v Alabam!!, knew what it was doing when enacting these laws that 
interact with one another, and because Congress, not the Court, was elected by the people, the 
Court must defer to their decisions unless they exceed the limits of Congressional power. He 
then uses a precedent laden analysis in rejecting the Government's first two constitutional claims, 
which he so rejects because as he views it, those arguments had no support in precedent and 
impermissibly expanded Congress' historical powers. The same is true of Roberts' analysis of 
the Medicaid expansion portion of the decision. The taxation power analysis is where he gets 
creative and is the part of this decision that is most important (and most criticized). The issue for 
Roberts is that he finds the shared responsibility charge is not a tax for purposes of the Anti-
Injunction Act because Congress specifically labeled it a penalty, but that it nonetheless should 
be considered a tax for the purposed of the taxation power under the Constitution. This obviously 
a fine distinction, and does not seem to fit with Roberts' approach in previous cases. If he 
144 132 S. Ct. 2566 at 2608. 
145 !d. 
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believed the penalty to actually be tax, the one would expect his ruling to find that the Anti-
Injunction Act applied, and so the suit could not move forward until the penalty is paid. To rule 
otherwise, as Roberts did, belies common sense. What the Chief Justice does however, is 
distinguish a statutory analysis from a constitutional analysis, so that for purposes of the 
interaction of the ACA and the Anti-Injunction Act, the penalty is a penalty and not a tax, but for 
purposes of the Constitution the penalty is a proper exercise of Congress' taxation power. 
C. After the Affordable Care Act Decision 
In Agency for Int'l Dev. v. Alliance for Ooen Soc'y Int'l. Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2321 (2013) 
Chief Justice Roberts wrote for the majority decision finding that the Federal Government's 
conditioning funding to nongovernmental organizations under the United States Leadership 
Against IDV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of2003(The Leadership Act) (on those 
organizations having "a policy explicitly opposing prostitution and sex trafficking") violated the 
First Amendment rights of those organizations. 
Roberts first reviewed the legislative history of the Leadership Act. He notes that 
Congress had concluded that HIV I AIDS had reached pandemic proportions in many countries 
across multiple continents as well as pronounced objectives that should be achieved by the 
President's strategy in carrying out the Act. 146 Additionally, Roberts mentions that of particular 
pertinence to the present case is that "Congress found that the "sex industry, the trafficking of 
individuals into such industry, and sexual violence" were factors in the spread of the HIV I AIDS, 
and determined that "it should be the policy of the United States to eradicate" prostitution and 
" th ual . . . . ,147 o er sex victuruzatwn. 
146 Agency for Int'l Dev. v. Alliance for Open Soc'y Int'l. Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2321,2325 (2013) 
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Roberts begins his discussion on the merits of the case by stating that "it is ... a basic First 
Amendment principle that freedom of speech prohibits the government from telling people what 
they must say" and that "[w]ere it enacted as a direct regulation of speech, the Policy 
Requirement would plainly violate the First Amendment."148 What remains is "[t]he 
question ... whether the Government may nonetheless impose that requirement as a condition on 
the receipt offederal funds."149 Roberts notes that while a party who objects to the conditions 
placed upon a particular item of funding generally has recourse by rejecting the funding, "we 
have held that the Government "'may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his 
constitutionally protected ... freedom of speech even if he has no entitlement to that benefit."150 
Roberts considers the Dissent's view that it is only when "the condition is not relevant to 
the objectives of the program ... or when the condition is actually coercive, in the sense of an 
offer that cannot be refused" that the Court should find such a condition to be unconstitutional. 151 
He dismisses this however by looking to precedent, that in his view is not so narrow. Roberts 
fmds that "[i]n the present context, the relevant distinction that has emerged from our cases is 
between conditions that define the limits of the government spending program-those that 
specify the activities Congress wants to subsidize-and conditions that seek to leverage funding 
to regulate speech outside the contours ofthe program itself."152 
Roberts compares two cases, Regan v. Taxation with Represenation of Washington and 
FCC v. League of Women Voters of California. In Regan the Court upheld a rule preventing 
§50l(c)(3) organizations from engaging in lobbying activities. The Court found that because an 
14B 133 S. Ct. 2321 at 2327. 
149ld. 
15o 133 S. Ct. 2321 at 2328. 
151 !d. 
152ld. 
33 
Steven Brander, 34 
organization seeking tax exempt status could incorporate separately as a 501(c)(3) entity subject 
to the funding condition and a 501(c)(4) entity not subject to the anti-lobbying provision, and 
further that such setup was not unduly burdensome to the entity, "[t]he condition ... did not deny 
the organization a government benefit "on account of its intention to lobby."153[footnote 2329]. 
In FCC v. League of Women Voters of California, the Court struck down a condition on 
federal funding to noncommercial television and radio broadcasters that prohibited all 
editorializing, even if private funding was used. Roberts finds that "[u]nlike the situation in 
Regan, the law provided no way for a station to limit its use of federal funds to non-editorializing 
activities ... [t]he prohibition thus went beyond ensuring that federal funds not be used to 
subsidize "public broadcasting station editorials," and instead leveraged the federal funding to 
regulate the stations' speech outside the scope of the program." 154 
In applying these and similar cases, Roberts notes that, "the distinction drawn in these 
cases-between conditions that define the federal program and those that reach outside it-is not 
always self:evident. .. [h]ere, however, we are confident that the Policy Requirement falls on the 
unconstitutional side of the line."155 In his view, ''whatever purpose the Policy Requirement 
serves in selecting funding recipients, its effects go beyond selection ... [t]he Policy Requirement 
is an ongoing condition on recipients' speech and activities."156 
Roberts relies on precedence for clearly establishing his position. In fact, he closes out his 
opinion with a reference to a case from seventy years ago, showing that his decision is in accord 
with the Courts long standing jurisprudence in this area of the law. He writes that, "we cannot 
153 133 S. Ct. 2321 at 2329. 
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155 133 S. Ct. 2321 at 2330. 
156 !d. 
34 
Steven Brander, 35 
improve upon what Justice Jackson wrote for the Court 70 years ago: "If there is any fixed star 
in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be 
orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess 
by word or act their faith therein."' 157 
In Hollingsworth v. Perrv, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the 
majority, found that official proponents of California's Proposition Eight ballot measure did not 
have standing under Art. III §2 of the Constitution. He first notes that Art. III §2 "requires the 
litigant to prove that he has suffered a concrete and particularized injury that is fairly traceable to 
the challenged conduct, and is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision" in order to 
prove standing. 158 Roberts also notes that the purpose for the Court to consider standing is to 
prevent the powers of the judiciary from being used to usurp the powers of the other political 
branches. 159 
Turning to the petitioners in this case, Roberts finds that they "had no "direct stake" in 
the outcome of their appeal. .. [t]heir only interest in having the District Court order reversed was 
to vindicate the constitutional validity of a generally applicable California law."160 He points to 
Court precedent holding that a general interest is not sufficient, stating that "[ w ]e have 
repeatedly held that such a "generalized grievance," no matter how sincere, is insufficient to 
confer standing."161 Roberts also finds that although the petitioners were uniquely connected to 
Proposition Eight as those responsible for gathering the signatures, placing it on the ballot, and 
putting forth the arguments in its favor, this connection existed only in the enactment of the law, 
157 133 S. Ct. 2321 at 2332. 
158 Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652,2661 (2013). 
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and that once it became part of California law, the connection was severed. 162 Roberts, 
addressing the Dissent and looking at the court's history then states that,"[n]o matter how deeply 
committed petitioners may be to upholding Proposition 8 or how "zealous [their] advocacy ... that 
is not a "particularized" interest sufficient to create a case or controversy under Article III."163 
Furthermore, Roberts finds that the petitioners cannot, in the absence of their own legal 
interest, assert the interest of the State of California on the state's behalf. As he notes, "[i]t is ... a 
"fundamental restriction on our authority" that "[i]n the ordinary course, a litigant must assert his 
or her own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest a claim to relief on the legal rights or 
interests of third parties."164 Even in the rare circumstances in which an exception to this general 
rule has been granted, the Court nonetheless required the litigant to have suffered a sufficient 
injury in fact that gives them an interest in the outcome of the dispute. 
Roberts then turns to the petitioner's argument that they have standing because the 
California Supreme Court determined that they were authorized under state law to assert the 
validity of Proposition Eight. The petitioners cited Karcher v. May, 484 U.S. 72 (U.S. 1987) 
in support of their argument. 165 Roberts however finds the petitioners reliance on Karcher 
misguided. He states that "[ t]ar from supporting petitioners' standing, however, Karcher is 
compelling precedent against it."166 This is so because the interveners in Karcher did so in their 
official capacity as state officials and state law allowed them to intervene. Furthermore, once 
162 133 S. Ct. 2652 at 2661-2663. 
163 133 S. Ct. 2652 at 2663. 
164ld. 
165 Here, the Court held that "the Speaker [of the New Jersey General Assembly] and the 
President [of the New Jersey Senate], in their official capacities, could vindicate [the] interest in 
federal court on the legislature's behalf' and thus could intervene is a suit against the state once 
the State Attorney General decline to defend a state law. 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2664. 
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they were no longer in office, neither intervener in Karcher could proceed. As Robert writes, 
"[ w ]hat is significant about Karcher is what happened after the Court of Appeals decision in that 
case ... [w]e explained that while they were able to participate in the lawsuit in their official 
capacities as presiding officers of the incumbent legislature, since they no longer hold those 
offices, they lack authority to pursue this appeal."167 
Roberts then turns to the dissent, finding that the cases they cited provide little if any 
support to the petitioners. He points out that the primary cases used by the Dissent fail to discuss 
standing and the remaining cases that do actually discuss standing are "easily distinguishable."168 
Roberts then turns to the use of dicta from Arizonans for Official English v. Arizon!!, 520 U.S. 
43 (U.S. 1997) case. Roberts notes that while the Supreme Court found the case moot, the Court 
did look at the standing decision by the Ninth Circuit, writing that the "Court expressed "grave 
doubts" about the Ninth Circuit's ... analysis."169 He further points out that the Ninth Circuit in 
Arizonans for Official English and the California Supreme Court in this case, never described the 
petitioners in agency terms, so Petitioners argument in this case that they were agents of the State 
is misguided. Roberts finds that "[t]he Ninth Circuit asked-and the California Supreme Court 
answered-only whether petitioners had "the authority to assert the State's interest in the 
initiative's validity."170 
Roberts concludes his opinion by saying again that standing in federal court is a question 
of federal law, and that "no matter its reasons, the fact that a State thinks a private party should 
have standing to seek relief for a generalized grievance cannot override our settled law to the 
167 133 S. Ct. 2652 at 2664, 2665. 
168 133 S. Ct. 2652 at 2665. 
169 133 S. Ct. 2652 at 2666. 
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contrary."171 He states that the standing requirement arises from a concern for separation of 
powers, writing that "[t]he Article III requirement that a party invoking the jurisdiction of a 
federal court seek relief for a personal, particularized injury serves vital interests going to the 
[limited] role of the Judiciary in our system of separated powers."172 
The Chief Justice dissented in United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) because 
he thought the Court lacked jurisdiction and that DOMA was duly enacted by Congress. As to 
the latter concern, he writes "(i]nterests in uniformity and stability amply justified Congress's 
decision to retain the definition of marriage that, at that point, had been adopted by every State in 
our Nation, and every nation in the world."173 Furthermore, Roberts does not agree with the 
majority's characterization of Congress' motive in passing DOMA, writing that "without some 
more convincing evidence that the Act's principal purpose was to codify malice, and that it 
furthered no legitimate government interests, I would not tar the political branches with the brush 
ofbigotry."174 
While he does not agree with their holding, Chief Justice Roberts credits the majority 
with effectively limiting it. He states that, "while I disagree with the result to which the 
majority's analysis leads it in this case, I think it more important to point out that its 
analysis leads no further ... (t]he Court does not have before it, and the logic of its opinion does 
not decide, the distinct question whether the States, in the exercise of their "historic and essential 
authority to define the marital relation," ... may continue to utilize the traditional definition of 
171 133 S. Ct. 2652 at 2667. 
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marriage."175 He also recognizes that the majority rests their opinion on sound principle. Roberts 
notes that, "I think the majority goes off course, as I have said, but it is undeniable that its 
judgment is based on federalism." 176 Additionally, he believes that the majority's reasoning 
based on DOMA's history and title are so unique to this case that the reasoning cannot be 
extended to other cases. Roberts concludes by stating that "I write only to highlight the limits of 
the majority's holding and reasoning today, lest its opinion be taken to resolve not only a 
question that I believe is not properly before us ... but also a question that all agree ... is not at 
issue." 177 
In these post-ACA decisions, Roberts approach resembles that used in the pre-ACA 
decisions, though, as noted above, parts of the Sebelius case are not at all disjointed from his 
overall approach. He uses precedent and Constitutional principles to find that Congress exceeded 
its power in Agency for Int'l Dev. v. Alliance for Open Soc'y Int'l, Inc.,. He also cites a decades 
old opinion to establish the historical breadth of the core principle of his position. In 
Hollingsworth Roberts makes it clear that there is no need to reach the constitutional question 
because narrow issue of standing was resolved against the plaintiffs in accordance with the 
Court's prior cases, undercutting the petitioner's argument using their own case against them. In 
Windsor, Roberts dissented because he felt the majority did not give due deference to Congress; 
the same deference he gave in the ACA decision and in the earlier cases. He also notes, 
approvingly, that the majority does a good job in keeping it's decision and analysis narrow and 
specific to the case at hand. 
175 ld. 
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IV. Conclusion 
Throughout his cases, Chief Justice Roberts displays a reverence for many different 
pillars of judicial analysis. He respects precedent but recognizes that it is the Court's 
responsibility not only to observe stare decisis, but to deviate from it when it is necessary to do 
so. He has a deep concern for the separation of powers, deferring to Congress wherever 
appropriate so as not to extend the powers of the Court beyond their traditional boundaries. 
Roberts also believes in Federalism and that the States have their powers so enumerated by the 
Constitution and that the Court must keep this in sight at all times. He also has an eye to history, 
citing back to the Founding and Supreme Court decisions from decades past and is open to 
considering the manner in which laws come to be. 
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